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How Hybrid is Hybrid 
Warfare? India’s Conundrum 
and Response
Rajeev Kapoor
The assumption that in hybrid warfare, the risk of military escalation 
and political damage could be kept within limits may, at the same time, 
increase the likelihood of its offensive use. For this reason, it is more than 
likely that hybrid warfare in various manifestations will shape the “face of 
war” in the 21st century. 
— Dr. Johann Schmid
Exordium
Given the current velocity of change, it is a certitude that the security 
dynamics of the world in the next two decades will be vastly different in 
appearance as well as character from these of today. A paradigm change 
in global security, as stated by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the 
General Staff of the Russian Federation, actually sums it up when he says, 
“… a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, 
be transformed into an area of fierce armed conflict, become a victim 
of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian 
catastrophe, and civil war ....”1
So, it can be irrefutably reiterated that ‘war remains a chameleon’ and 
we need to question and define as to what actually has changed. Yes, the 
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distinctive lines between war and peace have faded to a large extent and 
the space for classical state vs. state, military to military confrontation is 
being captured by state vs. non-state actors and criminal groups. These 
blurring lines between war and peace, state and non-state, regular and 
irregular, conventional and unconventional seem to suggest that the 
character of warfare is changing, with more options for pursuing strategic 
ends just below the threshold of traditional armed conflict. 
Prophesising the change, we can further add that conventional war is 
increasingly becoming intertwined with sub-conventional conflict, with 
hybrid war overlapping the irregular and conventional war dynamics (Fig 1).
Fig 1: Hybrid War Overlaps Irregular and Conventional War
Source: GAO Analysis of DoD Military Concept 
It will not be an overstatement to say that, in today’s increasingly 
globalised world, ‘wars are becoming conflicts’. It is a truism that all wars 
comprise conflict but the vice-a-versa cannot be true as the ambit of ‘conflict’ 
covers a larger canvas, from verbal disagreement to the use of force.
Therefore, if we look around, no one is fighting conventionally 
any more. Conventional wars are becoming a big proposition. Does it 
constitute to saying that ‘war as we knew it’ is over? May be, may be 
not, but confrontations and conflicts undoubtedly still occur unabated 
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around the world and the modifications which have come to the fore are 
that states no longer declare the wars; and having begun, they proceed 
according to a template which is unfamiliar.2
In fact, the objectives of war have changed fundamentally as 
capture of territories is now believed to be inefficacious. The increased 
interconnectedness of a globalised world can be categorically taken as 
one of the prime reasons for making traditional wars less attractive while 
economic, demographic and societal factors seem to have overtaken as 
the underpinning for all future conflicts. Consequently, these factors, 
being transnational in nature, are giving rise to sub-conventional warfare 
and hybrid conflicts.
Therefore, the moot question which this paper raises is: has hybrid 
warfare engulfed India; and is India is prepared to counter this threat? 
Much has been discussed earlier in this issue of the journal on what 
hybrid warfare actually means, its evolution and postulations, as well 
as it components. Therefore, this article delves directly into India’s 
preparedness for such challenges. 
Hybrid Warfare: India’s Conundrum 
Where does India stand in this muddle of hybrid warfare? Clearly, the next 
decade for India will not be like the last one. The challenges we face today 
will endure well into the future, but they will be overshadowed by emerging 
hybrid threats. It seems likely that these threats will grow faster, be deadlier 
and more ambiguous, while expanding into new physical and virtual domains.
Conceptually, India has its own share of challenges emanating from 
this paradox. But, what actually are these threats? And who actually are 
the perpetrators? This requires pondering over.
Identifying the Hybrid Threat 
Currently, India is facing major threats on both external and internal 
fronts i.e. non-state and state actors. On the internal front, we face a host 
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of challenges with varying objectives, ranging from Naxalism to separatist 
demands while China and Pakistan constitute the external threat. The 
external threats have the potential to synchronise with the internal players, 
to pose a bigger hybrid threat. 
The region around India faced hybrid threats even before this term 
was coined by Western theorists. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) comprised the perfect case of a hybrid threat. It had state-like 
military capabilities with an Army, Navy, and Air Force; it simultaneously 
managed and sustained the insurgent movement; and even had a world-
wide sophisticated propaganda network. 
In continuum, the Soviet-Afghan conflict of 1979-80 was the first 
modern hybrid war in the true sense and it happened in India’s backyard. 
Evaluating the immediate neighbourhood, the India-Pakistan rivalry 
has been engulfed in several ways by this trend. Pakistan has for long 
been arming and training terror groups to stage attacks on Indian soil, as 
part of its ‘proxy war’ strategy. Though, these terror groups till date do 
not possess any conventional warfare capabilities, the possibility of them 
wielding state-like destructive power, once emerging technologies make 
it easier, cannot be ruled out. If Russian or Iranian sponsored groups can 
achieve and exhibit this, there is no reason to assume that these Pakistan-
backed ones cannot follow suit in the future. 
Truly, the bigger and more ingenious hybrid threat to India is from 
China. Currently, China is smartly using Pakistan as an instrument of 
asymmetric war against India. There is clear evidence that the Naxal 
movement and northeast insurgency of India have been receiving aid 
from China, whose formidable capacity in hybrid warfare has been 
documented earlier. 
Another alarming threat which can be anticipated is from the Taliban. 
The way the dynamics of Afghanistan is unfolding, if the Taliban gains 
control over Kabul, Pakistan would certainly leverage it to train and plan 
attacks against India in general and Kashmir in particular. The Taliban 
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undoubtedly would allow Pakistan based militant groups like Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), to operate from its territory. 
India would be in a quandary to deal with these ‘strategic assets’ of Pakistan 
whose primary objective is contesting India’s control over Kashmir.
Besides the troika of Pakistan, China and the Taliban, the looming 
threat of ‘radicalisation’, the ‘fourth front’, is the most insidious part of 
hybrid war and a reality hovering over India. It is like fighting an enemy 
within, whose religious or ethnic persuasions can be manipulated by 
state and non-state actors alike for inflicting violence through newer and 
deadlier instruments of terror.3
Next in line stands the Maoist insurgency in India’s hinterland, which 
would continue to fester unless concurrent steps to make the indigenous 
people the stakeholders in development and good governance are seen 
to bear fruit. This ‘radicalisation’ and the Maoist insurgency can be 
manipulated by external players.
Sabotage of India’s growth through smuggling, dumping of goods, 
protectionism, circulation of Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) 
and similar activities by both China and Pakistan, comprises another 
hybrid threat which will require to be curbed through more ingenious 
methods. With respect to threats emanating from non-traditional 
sources like the use of water as a weapon through the creation of 
either shortages4 or oversupply (resulting in floods), or even large-
scale ecological damage, is another possibility.5
Thus, we need to dwell more on the so-called ‘two fronts’ of India 
i.e. Pakistan and China and decode what these two have done to wage or 
unleash their form of hybrid war on India.
The ‘Obsessed’ Pakistan
In the current dispensation, Pakistan has undisputedly captured the prime 
position in unleashing a highly refined version of proxy war strategy 
against India.
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A historical analysis of the major conflicts and wars fought by India since 
Independence reveals a common thread: hybrid war is being practised more 
and more. Virtually every war and conflict between India and Pakistan has 
seen hybrid warfare being practised by Pakistan. It continues to do so even 
during peace. Fidayeen attacks and mass casualty terror acts like in Mumbai 
in 1993, 2006 and 2008 are the manifestations of the hybrid war unleashed 
by Pakistan. In less than two years after the Kargil conflict, Pakistani-trained 
terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001, after which 
26/11 happened, followed by Pathankot, Uri and Pulwama. This clearly 
depicts that such proxy misadventures are unlikely to end.
Pakistan’s obsessive ‘ideological war’ against India always had a 
congenital connect to the idea of hybrid warfare. Pakistan as a nation 
pursues and practises hybrid warfare as a state policy. The pursuit of a 
hybrid warfare model to achieve its nefarious designs is not only against 
India but against Afghanistan too. While the Kashmir issue, coupled with 
the bitter memories of the 1971 debacle, remains the key determinant in 
the Indian context, the pursuit of strategic depth is the principle driver in 
the case of Afghanistan. 
Another factor that compels and makes Pakistan insecure is the 
conventional superiority of the Indian military and the nuclear deterrent. 
This explains Pakistan’s hybrid strategy against India in Punjab and 
Kashmir through support from local militants, who are provided economic 
and military aid, besides diplomatic support, by China. Pakistan has also 
raised militant groups like the LeT, JeM and others to work as proxies 
and permit it plausible deniability. Pakistan follows a similar strategy in 
Afghanistan with the Taliban as its proxy.6 Douglas A Livermore, a US 
Special Forces officer, writes that Pakistan’s support to the Taliban is to 
acquire “strategic depth on its western flank, allowing (it) to focus all its 
attention on India”. 
The case of Kulbhushan Jadhav, the alleged Research and Analysis 
Wing (RAW) spy is another glaring example of hybrid warfare. To gain 
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international support against India, Pakistan picked up Jadhav from Iran 
and later claimed to have him arrested from Gwadar.
Finally, if we scrutinise Pakistan’s modus operandi against India 
particularly in Kashmir, it emerges that it has actually espoused a three-
tiered hybrid strategy in Kashmir. First, it has targeted the very structure of 
the state through terrorism. This has been its most visible strategy which 
has made it difficult for India to maintain control over its own territory. 
Second, it has focussed on, and targeted, the psyche of the local population 
by methodically manipulating their emotions and sentiments. This strategy 
it has exercised through the Hurriyat and Over Ground Workers (OGW), 
the so-called unarmed jihadists. Thirdly, it has consistently carried out a 
passive invasion through social engineering, to hit the cultural pillars of 
Kashmiri society. The third strategy has actually hurt the state the most as 
it has split Kashmiri society between its roots of Kashmiriyat and Sufism on 
one side and Wahhabi Islam on the other.
The Hidden ‘Dragon’
China remains the ‘Chupa Rustam’ in this regional hegemonic game: it is 
playing its ‘hybrid cards’ clandestinely by providing traction to Pakistan’s 
hybrid game against India. China currently sits in a ‘comfort space’ 
dominating the ‘hybrid space’ created by Pakistan against India. India 
needs to understand that it is actually China, not Pakistan, as commonly 
perceived, that is the mastermind and is playing the ‘real’ and more 
dangerous ‘hybrid game’ with India. 
By following this opaque strategy, China is achieving its aim to kilter 
India so that it remains ‘boxed in’ by its problems in South Asia, leaving 
India with no leeway to concentrate on issues beyond its immediate 
neighbourhood. China sees India as a competitor and a potential threat 
to its strategic aspirations, and this insecurity has always underpinned its 
strategies against India. Hence, in this low-cost, high returns surreptitious 
game played by China, Pakistan remains an important cog. According to 
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Brahma Chellany, “By not defining the LAC, the Chinese are not only 
helping Pakistan by tying up large numbers of Indian troops along the 
Himalayas, but also retain the option to mount direct military pressure 
on India through border incidents if it attempted to play the Tibet card.”
The hybrid threat from China to India is a fast-growing and more 
potent one. However, there is lack of clarity on how it will manifest 
itself. Today, China, besides having an intent, also has the sophisticated 
wherewithal to unleash this kind of warfare on anybody in the world. 
Robotics and cyber attacks are likely to play a key role in shaping the 
future of conflict, and in both these spheres, China is among the best in 
the world. If these technologies subsequently get cheaper and easier to 
make, then we can envision a scenario of their unabated use by sponsored 
non-state actors. 
In 2015, India faced 36 major critical cyber attacks, meaning every 
15 days there were some aspects which were impacted, either in the 
banking system, air traffic system, rail reservation system or hacking into 
critical components of civil offices. Cyber attacks by China on various 
facets of the economy such as factories, energy supply grids, including 
wind and solar farms, banks, and railway and transport systems, can result 
in derailing governance, law and order and the economy. The effect of 
such disruptions could be accelerated through information warfare, use 
of fifth columnists and other subversive means.7
China’s military already has an in-built hybrid warfare strategy that 
includes expressions such as ‘informationalisation’, ‘special operations’, 
‘psy, media and legal warfare’, ‘cyber war’ and ‘peace and stabilisation 
operations’.8 Development of this capacity is further strengthened by 
the inexorable integration of China’s military with its political decision-
making.
Another issue which leverages China to outsmart others, including 
India, is that no one has till date taken cyber warfare onto the diplomatic 
level. Thus, there is no consensus on the response to Chinese cyber 
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attacks. This myopic vision might lead to a dangerous threat in the future 
for computerised modern societies.
Regarding any chinks in China’s armour, it appears that it is only 
China’s lack of experience in the conduct of serious warfare that can be 
pointed out, but then, as it is always said, “The best wars are generally 
fought by the first timers”. China, today, certainly has both the capacity 
and the will to wage hybrid war against India and to instigate Pakistan 
and India’s other neighbours.9
The Sino-Indian border dispute in the Indian Arunachal Pradesh 
and other smaller regions, which China claims too, has the potential 
for hybrid warfare. This perspective is based primarily on the economic 
underdevelopment in India’s side of the border, which contrasts vastly 
with the prosperity of neighbouring Chinese provinces. Therefore, in the 
future, there is a high possibility of Beijing covertly using such inequality 
to foment separatist sentiments among the local Indian population, which, 
regrettably, is culturally and ethnically close to the population of China.
Arming and training of pirate groups by China, to harass the ships of 
its smaller neighbours, including India, so as to legitimise an increased 
Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, can be another future hybrid 
threat scenario. This act would not entail crossing the threshold, but it 
would be pursuance of attaining military advantage. 
The ‘Markhor’ and ‘Dragon’ Collusivity
Collusive hybrid threats from Pakistan and China are a stark reality and 
pose an even more dangerous scenario for India. China uses Pakistan as a 
millstone to fix India and pursue its stratagem of ‘kill with deceit, and that 
too with a borrowed knife’. China flagrantly supports and defends hybrid 
war by Pakistan against India, and then, concomitantly speaks of ushering 
in peace and friendly relations with India. This ‘forked tongue’ policy of 
China reflects its disingenuous stance on hybrid war when it comes to its 
vested interests.10
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China has certain vested interests for which it has been conniving 
with Pakistan against India. These interests range from the strategic to 
the military, political, and economic.11
Strategic Interest: With the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC), Pakistan has become indispensable for China. It has increased 
the prominence of Pakistan in the strategic calculus of China. With more 
than US$50 billion at stake, the defence of Pakistan and its nukes has 
actually become a compulsion for China.
Political and Military Interests: These two interests naturally 
converge for China. China is in illegal occupation of 38,000 sq. km of 
Aksai China and 5,100 sq. km of Shaksgam Valley. Pakistan is the world’s 
largest recipient of China’s military largesse. As per the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 47 per cent of China’s 
military hardware goes to Pakistan, making it the topmost recipient of 
military aid from China in the last decade.12
Economic Calculus: Pakistan-China trade comprises slightly more 
than US$ 20 billion, with more than US$ 18 billion worth of imports 
from China and less than US$ 2 billion exports from Pakistan in addition 
to a projected investment of US$ 62 billion for the CPEC.13
Diplomatic Interests: Pakistan blatantly encashes on China’s veto 
power at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In return, 
Islamabad harps on the ‘One China Policy’, be it China’s position on 
Taiwan, Tibet or feigning ignorance about the human rights violations 
committed against the Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang. 
Impact of this Symbiotic Relationship 
In future, it would be extremely difficult for India to make any aggressive 
move against Pakistan without threatening Chinese interests. In fact, any 
Indian overture endangering thousands of Chinese citizens working on 
the CPEC project will certainly give China the locus standi to initiate 
hostilities against India. So, one can perceive that the operational or 
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strategic options for India have been substantially reduced. Anything 
beyond shallow skirmishes would entail the risk of drawing China into 
a ‘two-front’ war. As regards Kashmir, China has moved away from the 
position of studied neutrality to an overt pro-Pakistan stance.
Since cyber space has now become an electronic counterpart of the 
contemporary physical battlefield, any proliferation of China’s cyber 
capabilities to Pakistan and further to non-state actors could be another 
major concern for India. This scenario, if it occurs, can severely challenge 
India’s critical infrastructure security and would enlarge Pakistan’s hybrid 
war design. 
In future, one cannot negate the China-Pakistan connivance in 
manipulating and influencing elections in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) 
or as a matter of fact, the Indian Lok Sabha elections on the lines of the 
Russian meddling in the US elections. This nexus can also step up efforts 
to consolidate and advance a simmering discord under the surface via 
cyber intrusions and the deliberate distribution of false information. Such 
threats and situations would be catastrophic.
At the low end of the conflict spectrum, Pakistan might coordinate 
its ‘flourishing’ proxy war against India with China’s creeping 
assertiveness at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and its asymmetric 
threats in the cyber, information and outer space areas. Simultaneity 
and coordination amongst the jihadi strikes and Border Action Team 
(BAT) actions by Pakistan with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) 
Depsangor Chumar or Doklam type incursions could pose grave future 
threats for India.
China is believed to have added another attribute to hybrid warfare 
by constituting a private Army of retired PLA soldiers and its first 
company, De Wei, is setting up operations in Sudan. Such an Army is 
convenient, with no political liability, and is deniable being a part of 
private contractors. Extensive use and deployment of the same cannot be 
ruled out in Balochistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). 
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Another impact of this Pakistan-China nexus on India is that the 
Pakistan establishment is now less worried about its conventional 
defences, and is diverting ample resources, energy and time to strengthen 
its jihad architecture in India.14
Constituting an Effective Strategy and Response
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of 
war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.
— Giulio Douhet
India is facing sub-conventional war but is yet to experience the full 
dimension of hybrid war so far. Therefore, to defeat Pakistan and China in 
their hybrid strategy, India would need to accordingly calibrate its strategic 
and operational level responses. The response against both countries cannot 
be at the same level. For Pakistan, we need a balanced strategic, diplomatic 
and military response, while for China, the response needs to be skewed 
more towards the strategic and diplomatic vis-a-vis the military.
There is a great need to plan and implement the strategic 
dimensions, driven through politico-diplomatic means, complemented 
by Comprehensive National Power (CNP), including both hard and 
soft power. Besides, for achieving the desired results, it is imperative that 
operational actions be in sync and aligned with strategic directions.15
It goes without saying that a preemptive strategy would be best suited 
in the Indian context as it prevents occasions of military confrontation 
which have the potential to escalate into a nuclear catastrophe.16 George 
Perkovich and Toby Dalton of the Carnegie Moscow Centre have opined 
that practically speaking, India does not have many counter-options 
because of Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Devolving deeper, they say, 
“With a clear comparative advantage over Pakistan in economic clout and 
soft power, India can utilise a strategy for ‘non-violent compellence’ to 
isolate Pakistan internationally.”17
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More importantly, India needs a de novo look in its approach. So far, 
India has been overly moralistic against adversaries for whom morals and 
values are the least priority. Further, in the present geo-political realm, 
the economic logic and a sense of realism rather than norms and values 
would better serve India’s purpose. The present Indian strategic culture, 
rather than dealing with challenges from a perspective of ‘strategy’, or 
long-term planning, tends to deal with them through a paradigm of risk 
management. This is probably the result of being a democracy, where 
the elaboration and application of strategies are difficult, as the state of 
domestic politics often changes quickly and, occasionally, unexpectedly. 
Response to Pakistan
For long, India has been bogged down by one question: what if it 
responds to Pakistan’s proxy war with a conventional attack or a short 
and swift action, and in retaliation, it opts for a nuclear attack?
Now, with the two surgical strikes, India has demonstrated its political 
will to retaliate boldly at a time and place of its own choosing. Yet, I 
would say it is only a reactive response. 
What are the Options Left in the Response Mechanism?
Against Pakistan, is conducting further surgical strikes across the Line of 
Control (LoC) and air strikes on terrorist camps a solution? Is doing ‘a 
Pak on Pak’ by employing ‘our hybrid on his hybrid’ or the Hindi cliché 
eint ka jawab patthar se, the only effective way left to ‘motivate’ Pakistan 
to move away from its hybrid tactics against India? Or, on the contrary, is 
India’s use of the ‘economic and soft power’ strategy the right response? 
This merits a serious discussion and pondering over.
India would need an effective assortment of covert mechanisms 
and hidden channels for developing, using and exploiting hybrid tactics 
against Pakistan so as to build and sustain the required level of pressure 
and compel it to shift its approach against India.
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Some examples of doing ‘a Pak on Pak’ could be sabotaging the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) by exploiting the political unrest in 
Balochistan, thereby crippling Pakistan’s economic lifeline and infrastructure; 
influencing the political and social processes like elections and creating and 
nurturing pro-India socio-political groups, as allegedly done during the 
recent US election—the Gerasimov model of Russia is a successful and 
tested model to this affect; or employing online propaganda techniques to 
mould the ordinary Pakistanis’ opinion about the venality, corruption and 
brutality of their own military establishment; or exploiting the openness 
of the worldwide web to penetrate all Pakistani provinces and releasing a 
barrage of compromising facts and stories about the military and the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI). India needs to engage the institutions and people 
of Pakistan to hit and defeat their Centre of Gravity (CoG) or the fulcrum i.e. 
the Pakistan Army. This would be a long drawn but decisive strategy.
The Indian government’s opening of a Balochi mobile phone app, 
website and radio bulletins in 2016 was one such proactive move. India 
should take a leaf out of the Russian ‘non-linear’ hybrid tactics, which 
have flummoxed the West in Ukraine and elsewhere, amply emphasising 
that we are in an era of ‘hybrid warfare’ with shadowy ‘weaponisation of 
the internet’ to shape public perceptions and even overthrow regimes.18
But these are high risk strategies that India may find repugnant to its 
core philosophy and international repute. Besides, these are great options 
but are more like a last resort, just a step short of a full-scale war. Such 
options cannot be pursued in isolation beyond a point as they ultimately 
tend to tread on a dangerous path of a military confrontation escalating 
into a nuclear war, either accidently or deliberately. 
We also need to understand that, ideologically, Pakistan is predisposed 
to harm India at any cost, thus, these steps are in themselves insufficient 
to deter it, specially when its policy-making is ‘military oriented’. Imran 
Khan’s recent rant can be dubbed as ‘rhetoric’ but cannot be ignored 
knowing how irresponsible the ‘deep state’ of Pakistan is today. 
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Finally, to radically restructure Pakistan into a moderate neighbour, 
India must bring into play a range of balanced sustained instruments. 
What India needs today is to shift from its mostly knee-jerk approaches 
and adopt a balanced proactive and defensive approach. 
Response Beyond Military
It must be remembered that hybrid warfare is not just about the military. 
The military is just a constituent of it. In essence, it goes way beyond the 
‘military’.
In the diplomatic domain, India has, in recent years, reached a stage 
where it can leverage its resources to project Pakistan’s true image as a 
sponsor of terrorism, which should finally aim at declaring it a terrorist 
state. To disseminate reams of proof of Pakistan’s complicity in terrorism, 
India can dedicatedly appoint permanent envoys to approach foreign 
leaders, intelligence agencies and news media. The aim should be to 
expose how thuggish, military-run and jihadi-infested Pakistan is and 
how a righteous, secular and democratic India is becoming a victim of 
cross-border terrorism. Isolating a rogue regime like Pakistan, so that 
no country buys its false stories, would require assiduous lobbying and 
convincing.
In the economic domain, we need to further leverage India’s booming 
economy to get influential Islamic nations to invest in, and trade with, 
India. India must also file a suit at the International Court of Justice 
against Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism. The World Court ruled 
against the US for fomenting terrorism in Nicaragua in 1986. A symbolic 
legal blow from a global body that shames Pakistan as a terrorist state will 
come in handy to mobilise multilateral boycotts and sanctions against it.19
India needs to increase intelligence gathering and build resilience. 
The intelligence gathering policies should invest heavily to detect and 
track hybrid warfare activities, for example, increasing coordination 
among countries’ intelligence services. An aggressive intelligence posture 
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with expertise and specialists from diverse fields like technology, economy, 
finance, culture, arts and politics is what India really needs today. 
Resilience tends to create societal structures akin to the Cold War 
concept of ‘total defence’. Lessons can be learnt from Sweden and 
Finland, that have increased investment in preparing their societies for 
crises or war. Ukraine’s efforts in substantially increasing the size of 
Home Guard style units with the intention to signal deterrence to any 
actor contemplating an attack, whether the conventional or hybrid war 
type, is worth emulating. Creating more paramilitary style units and 
equipping and training them, is something that the Baltic countries have 
also increasingly done.20
The time has come to use our supremacy in technology against 
Pakistan, to our advantage. There is a need for the strategy to incorporate 
all the elements of national power, i.e., intellectual, economic, intelligence, 
cyber capabilities, scientific, business, trade and diplomatic, in a new 
security framework through which hybrid warfare can be channelled.
To cripple Pakistan in socio-economic terms, one issue that is often 
discussed and readily comes to mind is the Indus Water Treaty .which has 
been widely debated too. Strategists believe that by simply using our own 
share of water, which is legally available to us under the treaty, India can 
deliver a debilitating blow to the socio-economic fabric of Pakistan.
Lastly, India also needs to look inwards and factor in the present 
Kashmiri dispensation. India needs to proactively engage with 
the locals of Kashmir who happen to be the fodder or the CoG of 
Pakistan’s nefarious hybrid actions against India. New Delhi should 
continue to strangulate the flow of funds and expose the threads for 
the same. Although India has boosted the morale and pride of national 
mainstream civil society with the repeal of Articles 370 and 35A, its 
influence in the Valley and regaining the trust of the locals is yet to be 
seen. India needs to tirelessly nurture this strategic asset of the local 
population, to play a positive role in India’s integrity and growth to 
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counter Pakistan in the future. We need to ensure that the idea of 
Kashmiri nationalism comes closer to the idea of Indian nationalism. 
The final question, however, that remains is: how long will India’s 
patience will take to cross the self-imposed red-line and use proactive and 
unethical hybrid means to secure its geo-political ends?
Dealing with the Chinese Quagmire
Talking of the Chinese, their tactics are a bit more sophisticated, relying 
on cyber espionage and subversion in India, with special reference to the 
northeast. To deal with them, India needs to build asymmetric capabilities 
in terms of information, cyber, Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, big 
data and media. Pragmatically, there is a wide disparity between India 
and China in terms of the economy, military strength, defence industry, 
science, technology and innovations.21 Therefore, China needs to be dealt 
with at a higher plane of diplomacy and economics.
For China, India should garner world support for stricter laws against 
cyber attacks. Diplomatically, the currency diplomacy of the Chinese needs 
to be countered and exposed through our growing diplomatic clout in 
the world. Geo-politically, India needs to make the world realise that 
it needs a bi-partisan, multi-pronged policy to persuade China. Besides, 
China being an opportunist and self-centred nation, if positively pursued 
by the world, can conclusively rein in Pakistan and its ‘terror factory’, 
yielding tangible results. A multi-faceted, multi-layered national strategy, 
with synergised political, diplomatic, economic and military measures will 
have to be worked out. 
Since the China-Pakistan strategic embrace is not likely to change 
in the near future, there is a need for India to take measures which are 
bilateral as well as multilateral. It would be prudent for India to evolve 
a modus vivendi with China to minimise the mistrust and dilute the 
growing China-Pakistan nexus. If China is suitably engaged, then its 
acolyte, Pakistan, would follow automatically.
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The biggest leverage that India has is the importance of the Indian 
market for China vis-à-vis the benefits it derives from its economic and 
strategic relationship with Pakistan. India is one of the biggest trading 
partners of China and total trade between India and China is over five 
times the trade between China and Pakistan.22
India also needs to exhort the economic benefit that Beijing accrues 
owing to its trade surplus with India, which astonishingly surpasses the total 
investment it seeks to make in the CPEC. Would it be worthwhile for China 
to lose the Indian market? Former diplomat Gautam Bambawale—who has 
the unique distinction of being India’s High Commissioner to Pakistan 
and Ambassador to China—feels New Delhi needs to be transactional with 
Beijing to get the desired results. The give and take approach has worked in 
the not too recent past in the proceedings of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), where China worked with India to put Pakistan on the grey list, 
in return for New Delhi supporting China’s candidature for chairmanship 
of the inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and 
promotion of policies, at both national and international levels, to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing.23
Offering China foreign policy concessions in India-US military 
relations or the Sino-Indian border dispute in return for Beijing checking 
Islamabad’s brazen promotion of terrorism is a trade-off worth exploring. 
Pending that, as peace cannot be assured and ensured, India should 
be ready to support its military strategy of ensuring ‘deterrence’ against 
Pakistan, and ‘dissuasive deterrence’ against China, by developing its 
capabilities and force structuring in the future.
To conclude, our response to hybrid threats has always fallen short 
on understanding the psychological game which the adversary is playing 
with such deftness. India, therefore, needs to prepare, and prepare well, 
for all the hybrid eventualities to avoid getting surprised, as the threshold 
level and sentiments of the Indian public psyche have been enhanced 
post-surgical strikes. No longer can it be viewed with a myopic focus in 
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the classical form of conventional war or insurgency or terrorism. In sum, 
a thorough understanding of the nature and character of hybrid warfare 
is critical for all the political, bureaucratic and security forces decision-
makers at all levels down to the ‘Post and Jawans’ level.24 Every Indian, 
therefore, needs to fight the hybrid warfare waged by our adversaries. 
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